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Introduction
In classical logic, self-referring propositions can lead to pathologies such as the well-known
Liar paradox “This sentence is false.” Because it features an over-determination - if the
sentence is true then it is false, if it is false then it is true - the “Liar” leads to undecid-
ability, the impossibility to decide whether the sentence is true or false. Analogs have
been famously used in the foundations of mathematical logic, from Russell’s paradox to
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, passing by Tarski and Gödel undefinability theorem1.
In [1], Szangolies coined the expression “Gödelian hunch” to describe “the idea that
the origin of the peculiarities surrounding quantum theory lie in phenomena related, or
at least similar, to that of incompleteness in formal systems.” What if the paradoxical
nature of quantum theory could find its source in some undecidability analog to the one
emerging from the Liar ? This essay aims at arguing for such quantum Gödelian hunch
via two case studies: quantum contextuality as an instance of the Liar-like logical struc-
ture of quantum propositions ; and the measurement problem as a self-referential problem.
Quantum contextuality results from a theorem established by Kochen and Specker
[2], which shows that a quantum measurement cannot reveal a pre-existing value of a
measured property independently of the measurement context. Using a narrative based
on the Newcomb problem [3], the theological motivational origin of this result is introduced
in order to show how the theorem might be related to a Liar-like undecidability (section
1). I will also briefly present a topological generalization of contextuality [4] in which the
logical structure of quantum contextuality is compared to sequences of cyclically referring
statements, “Liar cycles”, which, associated with a truth predicate, lead to a logical
contradiction [5].
The measurement problem is often presented as a tension between the linear and
deterministic evolution of the wave-function following the Schrödinger equation and the
projection postulate. Nevertheless, the problem was also analyzed as emerging from a
logical error, and occurs because no distinction is made between theoretical and meta-
theoretical objects. I will present my analysis of the related Wigner’s friend thought
∗FQXi Essay Contest 2020: https://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/3518
†Univ. Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, Grenoble INP, Institut Néel, 38000 Grenoble, France ;
hippolyte.lazourenko-dourdent@neel.cnrs.fr
1The undefinability theorem stipulates that any description of the truth of a proposition must be
in a richer metalanguage than the language in which the proposition itself is stated ; this hierarchy of
languages arising as a solution of the Liar.
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experiment [6] and a recent paradox by Frauchiger and Renner [7], introducing the notion
of “meta-contextuality” as a Liar-like feature underlying the neo-Copenhagen interpreta-
tions of quantum theory (section 2).
Finally, this quantum Gödelian hunch opens a discussion of the paradoxical nature
of quantum physics (section 3) and the emergence of time itself from self-contradiction
(section 4).
1 A Gödelian Hunch from Quantum Contextuality
In 1960, inspired by Birkhoff and von Neumann’s axiomatic approach to derive quan-
tum theory from non-classical “experimental propositions” adapted to the experimental
result of quantum mechanics, Specker asked: “ Is it possible to extend the description of a
quantum mechanical system through the introduction of supplementary - fictitious - propo-
sitions in such a way that in the extended domain the classical propositional logic holds
[...] ? ” [8, 9] The answer is negative, “except in the case of Hilbert spaces of dimension 1
and 2.” A fruitful collaboration with Kochen will culminate in an enriched reformulation
of this result, today known as the Kochen-Specker theorem [2]. Thus, either a measure-
ment reveals a pre-existing value of a measured property depending on the measurement
context (quantum contextuality), or such value is unpredictable2 [11].
1.1 Counterfactual Undecidability
In his seminal work, Specker noticed an analogy between these simultaneously undecidable
propositions of quantum theory and the undecidability of counterfactual propositions3.
Hence, the question of an extension of quantum propositions in classical logic is paral-
leled with: “the scholastic speculations about the “Infuturabilien " [...], that is, the question
whether the omniscience of God also extends to events that would have occurred in case
something would have happened that did not happen. (cf. e.g. [3], Vol. 3, p.363.)" [9].
Can an omniscience extend to counterfactual propositions ? A possible positive answer
is given by the reference “([3], Vol. 3, p.363)”. The latter leads to a chapter on molinism,
an unorthodox form of omniscience proposed by scholastics in order to conciliate God’s
foreknowledge and human’s free will. According to this view, if God had predicted that
you will make a certain choice A, it may nevertheless have been in your power to do
something, such that were you to do it, God would not have predicted this peculiar choice
A. In a sense, God’s omniscience and human free will can co-exist at the condition that
the former is contextualized by the latter.
In order to illustrate the afored mentioned analogy, I propose the following narrative.
We invoke an omniscient demon whose omniscience extends to counterfactual proposi-
tions. Two observables A and B are given to a free agent, Alice. Alice can choose to
measure the observable B in two contexts: C1 := (A,B) or C2 := (B). Beforehand, the
demon has predicted her choice and, based on it, has assigned a value to B: v(B)|C1 = 0
or v(B)|C2 = 1. Alice measures the value of the observable in one of the contexts, and
assume that she verifies that the demon’s prediction is correct. One can then ask the
2For example the outcome might be brought-into-being by the act of measurement itself, “Unperformed
measurements have no results.”[10]
3A counterfactual proposition is a special kind of conditional proposition which follows the structure:
“If A′ had happened instead of A, then B′ would have happened instead of B.”
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counterfactual question: what would have happened if she had chosen the other context?
Two solutions are possible:
• (a) “If Alice had chosen the other context, she would have found a different value
for B.” In this case, the omniscience of the demon may extend to counterfactuals.
But this implies that either Alice is not free of her choices (superdeterminism), or
the omniscience of the demon is conditioned by the context she chooses (molinism).
• (b) “If Alice had chosen the other context, she would have found the same value for
B.” In this case, the omniscience of the demon does not extend to counterfactuals.
The demon would have been wrong. Because its essence is defined by its function,
denying it is an exorcism. Thus, the value of B is unpredictable.
This narrative is freely inspired by the Newcomb problem [3], a decision theory prob-
lem where the values associated to the prediction correspond to distinct earnings (e.g.
v(A) = 10k$, v(B)|C1 = 1k$ and v(B)|C2 = 1M$), the problem arising from the question
of which choice allows Alice to maximize her gains. Interestingly, the problem might
originate from a self-referential structure: “Newcomb’s problem may be understood as a
game against one’s self in which one’s choice is based on deliberations that attempt to
incorporate the outcome of this very choice.” [12]
A similar “circularity” lies under the counterfactual statements (a) and (b). It is of
course trivial to point out that nothing is quantum in the Newcomb narrative. Yet,
the non-Boolean logical structure of quantum theory yields analog conclusions: either a
value-assignement to all observables is contextual or one cannot assign predefined values
to all observables, i.e. these values are in general unpredictable. The self-referential
nature of these narratives hints at the presence of a similar circular structure underlying
quantum contextuality. Approaching contextuality as the fact that quantum theory is
based on intertwined Boolean algebras that cannot be embedded in a global Boolean
algebra highlights this Liar-like structure.
1.2 Topological Undecidability
In a topological approach by Abramsky et al.[4] based on sheaf theory and cohomology,
contextuality emerges when data which are locally consistent are globally inconsistent.
One can illustrate this definition by an analogy with famous undecidable figures such as
the Penrose triangle4 (Fig.1).
As noticed in [5], there is a direct connection between contextuality and classical se-
mantic paradoxes called “Liar cycles”, defined as sequences of statements of the form:
[{S1, S2} true ; ... ; {SN−1, SN} true ; {SN , S1} false] with Si the ith assertion, and
{Si−1, Si} and {Si, Si+1} the two “local" contexts of this assertion. Although every proof
of the Kochen-Specker theorem features such logical global obstruction, this generalized
approach does not reduce to quantum contextuality, and also incorporates non-locality as
a special case. As an example, the Hardy paradox [13] can be shown to entail contextu-
ality, and thus feature a Liar-like logical structure (cf. details in appendix).
4This is a figurative illustration which has a didactic purpose. Of course, sheaf-theoretic contex-
tuality cannot be reduce to this simple example. Moreover, the Penrose triangle cannot be paralleled
with quantum contextuality, where no proof of the Kochen-Specker theorem can be made out of three
observables.
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Figure 1: (a) Each individual bar represents an observable to which one assign a truth-
value. (b) Each observable is compatible with the other two separately, and thus two
local contexts can be defined per observable. The truth values assigned to observables in
a context are logically consistent. (c) The global picture of all bars glued together is an
undecidable figure, the Penrose triangle. One cannot define a global context in which no
truth-value assignment leads to a contradiction.
In such contextuality scenario, the contradiction occurs at the level of classical state-
ments, inferred from quantum propositions. The assigned values are both classical and
meta-theoretical, in the sense that they are not part of quantum theory. Hence, if meta-
theoretical statements are attached to quantum propositions, they cannot be embedded in
a global Boolean one in general. The non-Boolean logic of quantum theory contaminates
the meta-theoretical statements, which become globally undecidable. I argue that this
global undecidability of quantum propositions is in favor of a quantum Gödelian hunch.
2 A Gödelian Hunch from the Measurement Problem
As expressed in the literature, there exists different measurement problems (cf. e.g. [14]).
The one we wish to tackle addresses “ the question of what makes a measurement a mea-
surement. [...] There is nothing in the theory to tell us which device in the laboratory
corresponds to a unitary transformation and which to a projection !” [14]. This measure-
ment problem as been analyzed as a “logical error” emerging from a lack of distinction
between theoretical and meta-theoretical objects [15]. Similar conclusions explicitly un-
derlying an analogy between the measurement problem and Gödel’s theorem have been
made (cf. [1] for an overview). For example, Chiara notices that such analysis could seem
“to be very close to some similar limitative results that we have accepted in logic such
as the Gödel theorem (who realizes a proof of the consistency of a well-behaved scientific
theory, must be ‘external’ with respect to the theory (in the sense that he cannot use only
the proof theoretical tools allowed by the theory)) [...].” [16] I will analyze the Wigner’s
Friend thought experiment and the Frauchiger-Renner paradox -which shows that “a self-
referential use of quantum theory yields contradictory claims.” [7] - as sustaining this
Gödelian hunch.
2.1 Wigner’s Friend, Universality, Meta-Contextuality and Mea-
surement
The measurement problem we are dealing with is usually formalized as follow. A quantum
system is in the state |ψ〉 = α |0〉+β |1〉 ∈ HS . On the one hand, following the projection
postulate, the system will either be projected onto state |0〉 with probability |α|2, or state
|1〉 with probability |β|2 after the measurement. On the other hand, if the “observer”
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(e.g. the measuring device) is a physical system, then it shall be described by quantum
theory. A Hilbert space HO is associated to this observing system. Defining |M〉 the ob-
server state “ready to perform a measurement”, the initial state of the compound system
in HS ⊗HO is (α |0〉+β |1〉)⊗|M〉. In this case, the measurement process is described as
an interaction between the system and the device, and thus as a unitary transformation
U , resulting in U [(α |0〉 + β |1〉) ⊗ |R〉] → α |0〉 ⊗ |M0〉 + β |1〉 ⊗ |M1〉. Because the two
final states are physically distinct, there seem to be a tension between the postulates of
quantum theory, raising the question of how a measurement process should be described.
The Wigner’s Friend thought experiment [6] is a meta-illustration of this measurement
problem, which asks: what happens when an observer observes another observer observ-
ing a quantum system ? A quantum system, e.g. a qubit living in HS, is given to an
observer, Wigner’s friend, who can perform a measurement on this system in her labora-
tory. Outside her laboratory, another observer, Wigner, can associate a quantum state
to the compound system HS ⊗HO, where HO is a Hilbert space associated to Wigner’s
friend, e.g. a memory qubit |Mi〉 who can be interpreted as “Wigner’s friend observes
a projection on state |i〉”. While Wigner’s friend observes a collapse of the qubit, the
measurement process has been described as a unitary transformation from Wigner’s per-
spective. However both descriptions should be valid.
My analysis of this problem relies on the following terminology. The quantum system
is an object, since it is described by quantum theory. Wigner’s friend is an observer, and
as a user of quantum theory, is a meta-theoretical object, in short a meta-object. Wigner
is an observer who can perform a measurement on systems of the form object ⊗ meta-
object, and is thus a meta-meta-object, or meta-observer. The problem seems to arise
from the fact that an observer and a meta-observer are lead to describe the same event
in contradictory ways. I introduce the notion of meta-context as a set of the form {meta-
object,object}. This set is defined by a movable cut between theoretical objects studied
in the language of the theory and meta-theoretical objects which are out of the range of
the theory. In the Wigner’s friend paradox, two meta-context are involved: {Wigner’s
friend, HS} and {Wigner, HS ⊗HO}.
The problem can be understood as follows. Firstly, quantum theory is assumed to be
correct and can be applied to any object whatsoever. Such assumption is called quantum
universality (Q). Secondly, one assumes that truth values given by the propositions
associated with an object are independent of the meta-context, of whether the object is
theoretical or meta-theoretical, i.e. the truth values are non-meta-contextual (NMC)5.
Maintaining (Q) and (NMC) leads to an absolute form of universality: everything can be
described by the theory, irrespective of the meta-context, no cut is needed. But imagine
an infinite chain of observers observing observers observing a quantum system. Then,
meta- ... -meta-observers are invoked, ad infinitum. One could argue that the ultimate
meta∞-object is God, or some Laplacian demon. However, if such a demon can measure
the whole Universe, then the demon is necessarily excluded from the Universe in order
to avoid Liar-like inconsistencies, independently of the considered theory. As shown by
Breuer [18], if a theory is considered to be absolutely universally valid, then the theory
cannot be experimentally fully accessible, due to self-referential problems. There is a
tension between absolute universality (Q,NMC), in which the measuring process might
5This notion is equivalent to Brukner’s “observer-independent facts” [17].
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be treated theoretically, and measurement as a meta-theoretical process. In the light
of this analysis, the most appealing solution is to drop (NMC) and acknowledge the
observer for what it is: a meta-object. This way, the notion of meta-observer becomes
obsolete, and the logical inconsistencies are avoided (cf. Figure 2). The universality of the
theory is maintained, but becomes relative. Any object can be cut and become a meta-
object. However, once the cut is fixed, any out-of-meta-context question is undecidable .
“Although it can describe anything, a quantum description cannot include everything.”[10]
Figure 2: Inspired by Grinbaum’s epistemic loops [15], let us represent all theoretical
objects by a loop. Cutting the loop sends objects in the meta-theoretical domain. (a)
Meta-Context {Wigner’s friend, HS}. (b) Meta Context {Wigner, HS ⊗HO}. (c) Main-
taining (Q) and (NMC) leads to ignoring the relative cuts, i.e. the meta-contexts. Wigner
and Wigner’s friend are put at the same level, and self-referential inconsistencies may oc-
cur.
2.2 “Wigner’s Friendifications”
Recently, there has been a renewed interest in Wigner’s thought experiment in the field of
quantum foundations. This resurgence is due to the appearance of new hybrid paradoxes
[17, 7], which rely on a Wigner’s Friendification6, a transformation of previous quantum
“paradoxes” where one allows meta-objects to be described as objects of the theory, and
allows meta-observers to measure coumpound systems of the type “object ⊗ meta-object”.
I will analyze the Frauchiger-Renner paradox [7] as a Wigner’s Friendification of the Hardy
paradox explicitly showing the logical inconsistency which can emerge from (Q,NMC).
The original Hardy scenario involved two agents/observers, Alice and Bob, sharing a
two-qubit system. In the new thought experiment, Alice and Bob are upgraded to meta-
observers, while two new agents, their respective friends, share a two-qubit system and can
perform a measurement on their respective part of the system. Like in the standard sce-
nario, Alice and Bob’s friend can measure their qubit in the computational {|0〉 , |1〉} basis
or in the diagonal {|+〉 , |−〉} basis. Regarding Alice and Bob, these bases are “Wigner’s
friendified” as follows. The computational basis is transformed into a meta-computational
6In my knowledge, this terminology was first used by Aaronson in a blog post
(www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=3975) in order to describe the Frauchiger-Renner paradox.
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basis corresponding to an “observer basis”, a statement made by the observer, the friend7:
{|0〉SA ⊗ |0〉FA , |1〉SA ⊗ |1〉FA}. For example, if Alice’s friend finds his qubit in state|0〉SA , then his statement will be |0〉FA and Alice will find the global system in the state|0〉SA ⊗ |0〉FA . The diagonal basis of the standard observation becomes a meta-diagonal
basis corresponding to a “meta-observer basis”, where the meta-observer actually performs
a quantum measurement on the compound system, resulting in a statement associated to
the meta-observer:{|+〉A , |−〉A}, with |±〉A = 1√2(|0〉SA⊗|0〉FA±|1〉SA⊗|1〉FA). Applying
this Wigner’s Friendification to the four sentences of the Hardy paradox (cf appendix),
one obtains four new assertions:
Sentence FR1: “ “If Alice obtains “−”, then Bob’s friend obtains outcome “1”.”
Sentence FR2: “If Bob’s friend obtains “1”, then Alice’s friend obtains outcome “1”.”
Sentence FR3: “ “If Alice’s friend obtains “1”, then Bob obtains outcome “+”.”
Sentence FR4: “Alice and Bob both obtain “−” with a probability of 1
12
.”
Like in the Hardy paradox, these sentences forms a probabilistic Liar cycle: assume
that Bob and Alice both obtains ‘−’ (this happens with a probability 1/12). Bob obtains
“−” and Alice obtains ‘−” → Bob’s friend obtains “1” → Alice’s friend obtains “1” → Bob
obtains “+”, contradicting the first statement. In [7], the authors analyze this paradox as
an incompatibility between three assumptions: (Q) quantum theory is correct and can be
applied to systems of any complexity ; (C) observers and meta-observers claims should be
consistent with each other ; (S) a measurement yields a single outcome. Assumption (C),
in particular, has been widely discussed in the literature (cf. for example [17, 19, 20]). I
argue that this assumption can be reformulated into two assumptions: non-contextuality
and non-meta-contextuality.
Indeed, like the Hardy paradox, the Frauchiger-Renner paradox entails contextuality
in the sense of Abramsky: a global logical obstruction of four consistent propositions8.
Thus the contradiction might occur from assuming non-contextuality (NC). However, un-
like the Hardy paradox, here each statement can be associated to one agent: one for each
observer (FR2 and FR3), and one for each meta-observer (FR1 and FR4). In fact, like
in the original Wigner’s friend experiment meta-objects (the friends) are described in the
language of the theory, i.e. at the level of objects. As seen previously, this is equivalent
to the (NMC) assumption, which associated with (Q), can lead to self-referential incon-
sistencies when statements made in different meta-contexts are compared. Giving up on
(NMC), consistency is restored, but only inside a meta-context among {Alice, Alice’s
Friend ⊗ qubit SA } ; {Bob, Bob’s Friend ⊗ qubit SB} ; {Alice’s Friend, qubit SA } ;
{Bob’s Friend, qubit SB }. Under such analysis, the fact that “a self-referential use of
the theory yields contradictory claims” [7] is not especially surprising, if one acknowledge
that quantum theory can only be consistently used in a meta-context, i.e. that the use
of quantum theory is (meta-)contextual .
7 More precisely, it corresponds to a meta-observer asking her friend in which state has the qubit been
projected.
8 Note that the paradox has already been analyzed as applying classical logic to quantum propositions
which is forbidden by the non-Boolean structure of quantum theory [17, 19, 20]
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2.3 The Heirs of Copenhagen
Analyzing the measurement problem as self-reference and escaping the logical inconsis-
tency by introducing a cut9 complies with various “neo-Copenhagen” interpretations of
quantum theory, often wrongly labeled as “anti-realistic” [21], such as information-based
interpretations [22, 23, 24] and QBism [25]. All agree on the fundamental distinction be-
tween the meta-theoretical and theoretical object. In these interpretations, this movable
cut is functional and not ontological. It does not discriminate a macroscopic classical
world from a microscopic quantum one, because every object can be treated by the the-
ory (Q) or not. This is especially made explicit in Rovelli’s relational interpretation [24].
Following the footsteps of Bohr: “There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract
quantum physical description. It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find
out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature. We depend on our
words, our task is to communicate experience and ideas to others. We are suspended
in language ...” [26] ; or as Wittgenstein wrote in his Tractatus : “(5.632) The subject
does not belong to the world: rather it is a limit of the world.” Absolute universality
has a God-like flavour and leads to paradoxical features that cannot be said. On the
contrary, one can acknowledge the transcendental status of the meta-theoretical object: a
classical (Boolean) description is the condition of possibility for the rendering of quantum
(non-Boolean) events.
3 Conclusion: Is Physics Paradoxical ?
In his seminal paper on the logic of simultaneously undecidable propositions [8, 9], Specker
attached the following epigraph: “La logique est d’abord une science naturelle.” [Logic is
in the first place a natural science.] extract from “La physique de l’objet quelconque” by
Gonseth. Gonseth argued that logic should be considered as an experimentally refutable
science of “any object whatsoever”. If quantum physics goes against classical logic, thus
classical logic should be revised. Several years later, Putnam defended a similar idea in
a paper entitled ‘Is Logic Empirical ?” [27]. Mirroring this interrogation, we ask: “Is
Physics Paradoxical ?”.
Quantum theory does not only defy common sense, but it also defies classical logic, i.e.
our common language and semantic. In this sense, quantum theory is more paradoxical
than other physical theories. But is Nature itself paradoxical ? Does the world really
feature intrinsically strange phenomena that cannot be grasped with our words, whether
it is a non-local behaviour or parallel worlds ? In this essay, I argued for an alternative.
Quantum paradoxes are not physical, but emerge from a lack of metaphysical distanc-
ing . I highlighted how the Liar-like structure of quantum propositions enlightened by the
Kochen-Specker theorem already invites to give up on considering quantum objects as en-
tities with intrinsic properties independently of the questions asked by a meta-theoretical
object. I proposed the notion of “meta-contextuality” to explain how neo-Copenhagen
interpretations avoid the measurement problem, Wigner’s friend and Wigner’s friendified
paradoxes by analyzing them as logical errors. Acknowledging the need for an undis-
criminating cut between meta-theoretical and theoretical objects when one uses quantum
theory, any question that ignores this transcendental distinction looses its operational sig-
nificance and becomes physically undecidable. Thus, quantum paradoxes might just be
9Sometimes called the von Neumann or Heisenberg cut (“Schnitt”).
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instances of a fundamental undecidability, contributing to a quantum Gödelian hunch10.
Finally, this essay fully adheres to Wheeler’s intuition11: “Physics is not machinery. Logic
is not oil occasionally applied to that machinery. Instead, everything, physics included,
derives from two parents, and is nothing but cathode-tube image of the interplay between
them. One is the “participant”. The other is the complex of undecidable propositions of
mathematical logic.” [21]
4 Epilogue: A Gödelian Hunch from Time
In 1949, Gödel discovered solutions of general relativity later known as closed time-like
curves (CTCs) which theoretically would allow an observer to travel back in her own
past [29]. However, the existence of such closed causal loops seems to imply the possi-
bility for a traveller to interact with her own past-self, and for example prevent her own
time-travel. This paradox, known as the grandfather antinomy, shares the same logical
structure as the Liar. Unlike quantum theory, where the Gödelian hunch relies on the
semantic of the theory, the grandfather paradox is a (speculative) physical realization of
a self-contradiction.
By analogy with the scholastic debate previously introduced in 1.1, the paradox can
be understood as the tension between events that already happened and the ability to
decide whether these “physically-already-determined” facts can be changed or not. Here,
the role of God or the omniscient demon is played by time itself. Thus, one could deny
time its fundamental aura, and argue instead that it is emergent. In fact, inside a closed
loop, “time” is undefinable. Nevertheless, facing a global inconsistency, one can cut the
loop, and recover logical consistency. As Gödel wrote: “Time is the means by which God
realized the inconceivable that P and non-P are both true [...].” [30] This way, time emerges
from cutting self-referential paradoxes. Noticing that this cut might be epistemic, in line
with a Gödelian hunch, one could finally speculate that “Time is a consequence of every
attempt to provide a comprehensive description of the universe from within. Thus, time
in this sense is not related to the universe itself but to the attempt to describe it.”[31]
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Technical Appendices
The Hardy Paradox
In this scenario, two agents, Alice and Bob, share a two-qubits system in a specific entan-
gled state. Each agent can choose to measure their respective qubit in a computational
{|0〉 , |1〉} or a diagonal basis {|+〉 , |−〉} with |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉). The initial entangled
state can thus be written in four different basis, each corresponding to a measurement con-
text. For example, in the comput.-comput. basis, the state is: |ψ〉 = 1√
3
(|00〉+|10〉+|11〉).
Assuming that a predefined value can be associated to a measured property when a result
can be predicted with certainty, one can infer the four following sentences, each associated
to a measurement context:
(1) • In the diago.-comput. basis, the state before measurements is:
|ψ〉 =
√
2
3
|+0〉+ 1√
6
|+1〉 − 1√
6
|−1〉
Sentence H1 : “If Alice obtains ‘−’, then Bob obtains ‘1’.”
(2) • In the comput.-comput. basis, the state before measurements is:
|ψ〉 = 1√
3
(|00〉+ |10〉+ |11〉)
Sentence H2 : “If Bob obtains ‘1’, then Alice obtains ‘1’.”
(3) • In the comput.-diago. basis, the state before measurements is:
|ψ〉 =
√
2
3
|1+〉+ 1√
6
|0+〉+ 1√
6
|0−〉
Sentence H3 : “If Alice obtains ‘1’, then Bob obtains ‘+’.”
(4) • In the diago.-diago. basis, the state before measurements is:
|ψ〉 = 3√
12
|++〉+ 1√
12
|+−〉 − 1√
12
|−+〉+ 1√
12
|−−〉
Sentence H4 : “Alice and Bob can both obtain ‘−’ with a probability 1/12.”
Assuming non-contextuality means that one can build inferences from these different
sentences. For instance, from (H1, H2, H3), one can construct the sentence: “If Alice
obtains ‘−’, then Bob obtains ‘+’ ”. However, this sentence is incompatible with H4.
Thus, ((H1, H2, H3), H4) is globally inconsistent, and the paradox entails contextuality.
The following probabilistic12 Liar cycle can be formulated, assuming that both Alice and
Bob obtained ‘−’: Bob obtains ‘−’ and Alice obtains ‘−’ → Bob obtains ‘1’ → Alice
obtains ‘1’ → Bob obtains ‘+’, contradicting the first assignment.
12The Hardy paradox is a probabilistic Liar cycle because the contradiction only occurs with a proba-
bility 1/12.
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“Wigner’s Friendification” of the Hardy Paradox
The Hardy paradox presented above is Wigner’s friendified as follows: The computational
basis is transformed into a meta-computational basis corresponding to an “observer basis”
{|0〉SA ⊗ |0〉FA , |1〉SA ⊗ |1〉FA}. The diagonal basis of the standard observation becomes a
meta-diagonal basis corresponding to a “meta-observer basis”:{|+〉A , |−〉A},
with |±〉A = 1√2(|0〉SA ⊗ |0〉FA ± |1〉SA ⊗ |1〉FA). The corresponding sentences can then be
derived:
(1) • In the metaobserver-observer basis, the state before measurements is:
|ψ〉tot =
√
2
3
|+〉A |0〉SB |0〉FB +
1√
6
|+〉A |1〉SB |1〉FB −
1√
6
|−〉A |1〉SB |1〉FB
Sentence FR1: “If Alice finds the outcome ‘−’, she knows that Bob’s friend obtained
outcome ‘1’.”
(2) • In the observer-observer basis, the state before measurements is:
|ψ〉tot =
1√
3
(|0〉SA |0〉FA |0〉SB |0〉FB + |1〉SA |1〉FA |0〉SB |0〉FB + |1〉SA |1〉FA |1〉SB |1〉FB)
Sentence FR2: “If Bob’s friend finds the outcome ‘1’, he knows that Alice’s friend
obtained outcome ‘1’.”
(3) • In the observer-metaobserver basis, the state before measurements is:
|ψ〉tot =
√
2
3
|1〉SA |1〉FA |+〉B +
1√
6
|0〉SA |0〉FA |+〉B +
1√
6
|0〉SA |0〉FA |−〉B
Sentence FR3: “If Alice’s friend finds the outcome ‘1’, she knows that Bob obtained
outcome ‘+’.”
(4) • In the metaobserver-metaobserver basis, the state before measurements is:
|ψ〉tot =
3√
12
|+〉A |+〉B +
1√
12
|+〉A |−〉B −
1√
12
|−〉A |+〉B +
1√
12
|−〉A |−〉B
Sentence FR4: “Alice and Bob both find the outcome ‘−’ with a probability of 1
12
.”
The experiment is repeated n times. A contradiction arises when the four statements
are combined and when, for the nth round, Bob obtains outcome “−” and knows that
Alice also obtains outcome “−” (FR4). From FR1, Bob knows then that Alice’s friend
obtained outcome “1”, and thus, from FR2, that Bob’s friend obtained outcome “1”. But,
from FR3, this implies that Bob knows that he himself obtained outcome “+”, contra-
dicting the fact that he obtained outcome “−”.
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